Discriminatory vs Uniform Price Auction: Auction Revenue by Keunkwan Ryu et al.
 -   1   -
Discriminatory vs Uniform Price Auction: Auction Revenue 





Mirae Asset Co., Korea 
and 
 Seonghwan  Oh 
Dept. of Economics 




Dept. of Economics 
Seoul National University 
 
                                  J u l y   1 4 ,   2 0 0 3  
                              ( r e v i s e d   F e b r u a r y   2 6 ,   2 0 0 4 )  
 
Abstract: We compare auction revenues from discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions in 
the case of the Korean treasury bonds auction market. For this purpose, we employ detailed bidder 
level data for each of 16 discriminatory auctions recently carried out in Korea. We first theoretically 
recover unobserved individual bidding functions under counter-factual uniform price auctions from 
the observed bidding functions under the actual discriminatory auctions, and then empirically estimate 
revenue differences. To test significance of the auction revenue differences, we use Bootstrap re-
sampling methods where uncertainty in the cut-off yield spreads and uncertainty in the bidders are 
addressed individually as well as simultaneously. Our results indicate that uniform price auction 
increases the auction revenue relative to the discriminatory auction in most of the 16 cases, justifying 
the Korean government’s decision to switch to the uniform price auction mechanism. 
 
Keywords:  Treasury bonds auction, discriminatory auction, uniform price auction, hazard rate, 
Bootstrap re-sampling, yield spread, bidding function, bid shading 
JEL Classification: D44, C51, C81 
                                            
* Correspondence to Keunkwan Ryu, Department of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-
742, Korea. The first draft of this paper was prepared while the corresponding author was visiting ISER, 
Osaka University, summer 2003. Ryu would like to thank Charles Horioka for his hospitality and helpful 
comments.  -   2   -
1. Introduction 
 
We compare auction revenues from discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions in the 
case of the Korean treasury bonds auction market. For this purpose, we use detailed bidder level data 
for each of 16 discriminatory auctions recently carried out in Korea. Using a theoretical model, we 
first recover unobserved individual bidding functions under counter-factual uniform price auctions 
from the observed bidding functions under actual discriminatory auctions, and then estimate the 
auction revenue differences. To test significance of the auction revenue differences, we use 
Bootstrapping re-sampling methods by which we address uncertainty in the cut-off yield spreads as 
well as uncertainty in the bidders. Our results indicate that the uniform price auction increases the 
auction revenue relative to the discriminatory auction in most of the 16 cases analyzed, justifying the 
Korean government’s decision to switch to the uniform price auction in the year 2000. 
Let us briefly overview the Korean treasury auction market. The Korean government has 
adopted a competitive bidding system in the treasury bonds auction market, September 1999. There 
exist 24 primary dealers and 6 candidate dealers for a total of 30 dealers who are exclusively entitled 
to submitting bids in the Korean treasury auction. The Korean treasury has nominated 6 candidate 
dealers for the purpose of “internship” before promoting them to primary dealers. Most of the 30 
dealers are either banks or security companies. Their market powers are evenly distributed in terms of 
bidding and winning amounts. The Korean treasury auction market is competitive. 
Under the discriminatory auction, “what you bid is what you pay.” The bigger the uncertainty 
about the auction cut-off price, the less willing you become to bid, so called “bid shading.” Bid 
shading is more severe as the uncertainty in the cut-off price increases. Lack of the so called “when-
issued market” delays the price discovery process in the Korean treasury auction market on one hand, 
whereas it precludes the possibility “short squeeze” on the other.  -   3   -
Depending on whether the uncertainty is large or not, auction revenue criterion favors either 
the switch to the uniform price auction or the continuation of the discriminatory auction. We use 
historical auction spread distribution as a measure of the uncertainty in the treasury auction market. 
We only use those auction spreads that are observed under historical discriminatory auction cases. 
Using this measure of auction uncertainty, we identify the magnitude of bid shading and thus revenue 
gap between the actual discriminatory auction and the counter-factual uniform price auction for each 
of the 16 discriminatory auction cases actually implemented recently in Korea. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing literature 
on the treasury bond auction. Section 3 introduces a standard auction model showing the differences in 
bidder behavior under the two different auction mechanisms. Section 4 explains the data and the 
econometric model. Results are reported in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Auction revenue depends on the underlying auction mechanism. Under a set of conditions, 
Vickery (1961) shows that the auction revenue is the same whether one uses a first price auction or a 
second price auction. This famous “revenue equivalence theorem,” however, does not hold in divisible 
multiple unit auctions as in the case of the treasury bond auction. Revenue comparison becomes even 
more difficult as one considers the common value aspect of the treasury bond. Earlier, Friedman 
(1960) raises a possibility that the uniform price auction may result in more auction revenues than the 
multiple price auction. 
Milgrom and Weber (1982), Bikchandani and Huang (1989, 1993), and Chari and Weber 
(1992) analyze the treasury auction market. Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993), and Wang and 
Zender (1996) introduces a divisible goods assumption to make their analyses compartible with the  -   4   -
treasury auction.   
Bikchandani and Huang (1989), and Chatterjea and Jarrow (1998) analyze the interaction 
between the primary and the seconary markets. According to Bikchandani and Huang (1989), bidders 
with maket power would like to bid more aggressively in the primary (auction) market to signal their 
strong valuation to the secondary market, and in fact they do so at a lower cost under the uniform price 
auction. Chatterjea and Jarrow (1998) argue that bidders with market power bid more aggressively in 
the primary market to squeeze out those auction participants with a short position in the “when issued 
markets,” so called a “short squeeze” phenomenon. 
Viswanathan and Wang (1998) view the primary dealers as market makers in the treasury 
auction market.   
As theoretical approaches do not provide any conclusive results, there have arisen empirical 
approaches to compare auction revenues across the discriminatory and the uniform price auctions. 
Most empirical studies compare the observed auction spreads across those two auction mechanisms. 
Umlauf (1993a) reports that the Mexican government’s auction revenue slightly increased as Mexico 
switched its treasury auction mechanism from the discriominatory one to the uniform one. Regarding 
the US, Simon (1994) reports that the auction revenue decreased as the US government switched its 
auction mechanism from the discriminatory to the unifrorm in the 70s, whereas Nyborg and 
Sundaresan (1996) and Malvey and Archibald (1998) report that the auction revenue increased under 
the uniform price auction in the 90s (statistically not significant, though).   
Applicability of these empirical approaches is limited in the following two senses. First, they 
cannot be used unless a country has experimented both auction mechanisms. Second, they do not use 
detailed, micro-level bidding information. An alternative structural approach overcomes these 
drawbacks. The structural approaches recover “counter-factual” bidding fuctions under the uniform 
price auction from the observed bidding functions from the discriminatory auction. The approach can  -   5   -
be applied even to a country which has only experienced the discrominatory auction mechanism. The 
structural approach relies on micro level bidding information to recover the counter-factual bidding 
function. 
Nautz (1995) develops a theoretical model for the above structual approach. Heller and 
Lengwiller (1998) analyze the Swiss treasury auction using the structual approach. Hortacsu (2002a,b) 
adds strategic interactions among the bidders to the structural approach. 
  
3. Theoretical Model 
 
Treasury auction is a multiple unit, divisible goods auction. The treasury, as auctioneer, puts 
on the table a fixed amount of Treasury bonds. In the Korean treasury auction market, there are a total 
of 30 potential bidders who are more or less homogeneous. We assume that each bidder has a common 
belief on the distribution of the cut-off price in the auction, and that there are no strategic interactions 
either between auctioneers and the bidders or among the bidders. We consider a private value auction 
model where different bidders’ private values are not affiliated (Milgrom and Weber 1982). 
     To be able to recover unobserved bidding behaviors under the counter-factual uniform price 
auction from the observed behaviors under the actually implemented discriminatory auction, we need 
to characterize theoretically bidders’ bidding behaviors under each auction mechanism and to identify 
their relationship. 
     Section 2.1 introduces the basics. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 characterize the bidding behaviors 
under the discriminatory and the uniform price auctions. Section 2.4 recovers the bidding function 
under the counter-factual uniform price auction from the bidding function under the actual 
discriminatory auction. 
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3.1. Basics 
 
Bidders determine their bidding strategy to maximize their expected profits. Each bidder is 
allowed to submit up to five (price, quantity) pairs. The bidding prices are denominated in terms of 
yield to maturity with a tick size of one basis point, that is, one hundredth of one percent point. 
Let  } , , { 1 k p p P " =   be the support of the market clearing cut-off yield spread, say  p . We 
arrange  j p ’s in an increasing order,  k p p < <" 1 . As a result a more aggressive bid corresponds to a 
lower value of  j p . 
The yield spread is the difference between the market clearing yield (so called the cut-off 
yield) and the secondary market yield of the same class of treasury bonds (at morning close on the 
same day). A higher yield spread means a higher yield to the bidders relative to the yield anticipated 
from the secondary market, and a lower bond price to the treasury.   
Let the yield spread distribution (under the discriminatory auction) be represented by 
) , , ( 1 1 − = k f f f " , where  ) Pr( 1 1 p p f = = ,  ⋅⋅⋅,  ) Pr( 1 1 − − = = k k p p f . Of course, one has 
) ( 1 ) Pr( 1 1 − + + − = = k k f f p p " . For notational consistency, let us denote this value as  k f . We 
assume that  0 ) Pr( > = j p p  for each of k j , , 1" = .
*  The yield spread distribution can be 
equivalently represented as a  1 ) 1 ( × − k  vector  ) , , ( 1 1 − = k h h h "  of the so called hazard rates, 
where  ) /( k j j j f f f h + + = " ,  1 , , 1 − = k j "  Let us further define  0 0 = h  and  1 = k h  for later 
use. 
The hazard rate is the most important concept in life-time, mortality, and duration analyses. It 
is the conditional probability of “death” given survival up to now. To understand this concept, imagine 
                                            
* In the empirical implementation, we only consider those support points  j p ’s  where bids are ever made in the historical 
data, justifying the assumption  0 ) Pr( > = j p p  for each of  k j , , 1" = .  -   7   -
that you are conducting an “ascending yield” auction. Define death as the end of the auction process. 
The auction ends as soon as the total amount of bids exceeds the fixed total supply. Hazard rate at a 
given yield spread denotes the chance that the game ends exactly at that yield spread level conditional 
on that the auctioneer has just announced that level after passing all the previous levels. At a low 
enough yield spread level, say  0 p , no bidder would bid. According to the common belief, the chance 
that the auction process ends at that low level is zero,  0 0 = h . On the other hand, suppose you have 
already reached a highest possible yield spread level, say  k p . At  k p , every bidder would bid so far 
as the bid is beneficial from her own perspective. According to the common belief, the chance that the 
auction process ends immediately at that high level is one, resulting in  1 = k h . 
Let  i  index individual bidders in a given discriminatory auction case,  n i , , 1" = . Bidder 
i submits up to a maximum of 5 pairs of price and quantity,  ) , ( ij ij p ∆ ,  i m j , , 1" =  where  i m  is 
the number of bids submitted by bidder i . Of course, by regulation,  } 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 { ∈ i m . From 
i m j ij ij p , , 1 } , { " = ∆ , one can construct bidder  i ’s individual bidding function as a step function with  i m  
steps. Let  ) ( j i p b   be the amount of bid submitted by bidder  i   at or below the yield spread  j p  and 
denote it simply as  ij b . Do not forget that we are measuring the “price” using the yield spread which 
is inversely related with the bond price. We have  ∑
≤
∆ =
j ij p p j
ij j i p b
' : '
' ) ( , Let  ) ( ) ( j i i p b p b =  for 
1 + < ≤ j j p p p  ( 1 , , 1 − = k j " ),  0 ) ( = p bi  for  1 p p <  and  ) ( ) ( k i i p b p b =  for  k p p ≥ . It 
represents the demand function of bidder  i . By summing the individual demand functions, we have 





i p b p B
1
) ( ) ( . 
Let us normalize to one the total (fixed) supply of the treasury bonds in a given auction. 
Accordingly, we represent all the quantities as a fraction of the total supply. The cut-off yield spread is 
determined from solving  1 ) ( = p B . In fact, due to discrete nature of the bidding, the market clearing  -   8   -
yield spread is determined as the minimum price among the elements of  j p ’s in the set 
} 1 ) ( | { ≥ j j p B p . 
As we observe  } , { ij ij p ∆  for  i m j , , 1" = ,  n i , , 1" = , we can compute the market 
demand function, the market clearing price, and the auction revenue under discriminatory auction. 
Remember that  ij p ’s are spreads (in terms of 1 basis point) between the bidding yield and the market 
yield in the secondary market. That is,  2 − = ij p   denotes that the bidding yield is 2 basis point lower 
than the market yield for the same class of bonds (or close substitutes). The  ij ∆   is the amount of bid, 
as a percentage fraction of the total supply, that bidder  i  bids at the bidding yield spread  ij p . For 
example,  10 = ∆ij   (%) denotes that the quantity bid by bidder  i  at the bidding yield spread  ij p  is 
10% of the total supply. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the equilibrium cut-off yield spread is determined using the micro-
level bidding data on the discriminatory auction which occurred on July 18, 2000. (A full set of micro 
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Figure 1: Market demand function and cut-off price 








































Now, suppose that you have derived individual demand functions under the counter-factual 
uniform price auction. Let  n i i p s , , 1 )} ( { " =  be a collection of such counter-factual demand functions 
constructed for each individual who has participated in the discriminatory auction. (Here we are 
implicitly assuming that bidder composition does not change as the auction mechanism changes, 
which assumption sounds a bit strong. We will revisit this issue later.) By summing the individual 





i p s p S
1
) ( ) ( . Under the 
hypothetical uniform price auction, the market clearing price would have been determined as the 
minimum price among the elements of  j p ’s in the set  } 1 ) ( | { ≥ j j p S p . 
In sections 2.2 through 2.4, we would like to characterize  ) (p bi  and  ) (p si , and their   - 10 -
relationship. This relationship will turn out most important when comparing auction revenues later on. 
 
3.2. Discriminatory price auction 
 
Assume that individual bidders enjoy private values from the treasury bonds, that the private 
values are not affiliated (Milgrom and Weber 1982), and that individual bidders do not strategically 
interact. Let  ) (
1 q di
−  be the marginal value to bid  i arising from securing one additional share of 
the Treasury bond when she has already secured q . Under the assumptions, we neither put any 
functional form restrictions across different  ) (
1 q di
− ’s nor solve the individual bidding behaviors 
considering strategic interactions (the same setting as in Lengwiler 1998, for example). 
Consider the “price” of a treasury bond (with face value of one) which pays coupons at the 
prevailing yield. Let  d   be the duration of the bond and  p   the yield using one basis point (=10
-4) as 
the measurement unit. (The same  p  now denotes yields, not the yield spreads. Here we are 
obviously abusing notations for the purpose of notational simplicity.) Using a linear approximation, 
we can approximate the bond’s price as “
4 10 1 price
− × × − = j p d .” 




































' 10 1 price j j p d
− − = ,  1 ' ' ' − − = ij ij ij b b ∆ ,  0 0 = i b   and “no rationing at the margin” are used. 
In fact, this optimization is a bit different from the treasury auction practices in Korea where 
participants are allowed only up to a maximum of 5 bids which are in general smaller than  k . We do   - 11 -
not think ignoring this difference would bias our empirical results. See Appendix Table A1 for the 
number of bids per bidder. 




− − = −
k
j j





* * 1 ) ( ] ) ( [   ⇔  )] 1 / 1 )( ( [
*
1
* * − − + = + j j j j i ij h p p p d b , 
where we have used (i)  ) /( k j j j f f f h + + = " , (ii)  0 ≠ j f , and (iii) the definition of 
j j p d p
4 * 10 1
− − = . Note that the general solution takes the form  ) ( ) (
* *
j j i j i ij p d p b b δ + = =  with 
0 ) 1 / 1 )( (
*
1
* * ≥ − − = + j j j j h p p δ . 
  Not to cause confusion to the readers, let us comment on the usage of notations in the rest of 
the paper. We are moving back and forth between the unit bond prices and the bond yields. 
Measurements in terms of unit bond prices are denoted with an asterisk (*), and measurements in 
terms of bond yields are denoted without an asterisk. For example, 
*
j p  and 
*
j δ  are measured in 
bond prices, whereas  j p  and  j δ   (as to be defined shortly) in bond yields. 
The solutions allow nice economic interpretations. First, we observe that individual bidders 
shade their bids in the sense that their actual bids are smaller than the “truth-revealing” bids, 
) ( ) ( ) (
* * *
j i j j i j i p d p d p b ≤ + = δ . As is well known, the reason for bid shading here under the 
discriminatory price auction is essentially the same as bid shading in the first price sealed bid auction.   
What is less well known is that it is also similar to “shirking” in a typical principal-agent 
model. The solution has exactly the same form if you map bidding to effort level, and cut-off yield 
distribution to agent type distribution. “What you pay” is the bidding yield in the case of the 
discriminatory auction and the effort level in the case of agent models. “What you get,” however, is 
not exactly one for one. Rather a fraction of what you pay, resulting in bid shading and effort shirking. 
Under the discriminatory auction, if a bidder believes that she still has a chance to secure an additional   - 12 -
share of the bond, she faces an incentive to under-bid, that is, to shade. To save on payment, she bids 
less so far as chances are there, resulting in bid shading. 
Second, only at  k p   shading does not occur,  ) ( ) ( ) (
* * *
k i k k i k i p d p d p b = + = δ  since  1 = k h  
and thus  0
* = k δ . According to the belief about the cut-off yield, you have already reached the 
maximum possible yield level at  k p . There is absolutely no chance that the market clearing yield 
further goes up passing  k p  Knowing this, bidders face no incentive to shade. Bidder  i  submits a 
bid if she wants an additional share in the sense that 
* 1 ) ( k i p q d ≥
− , and not otherwise, leading her to 
bid  ) (
*
k i p d  at  k p . At each “candidate” yield level, the bidder ask herself, “Would the ascending 
auction further go up?” If the answer were positive, she would shade. Otherwise, she would reveal the 
truth. 
Third, shading depends on your belief about the market clearing yield level. As well known 
in the literature, there exists one-to-one relationship between  ) , , ( 1 k h h "  and  ) , , ( 1 k f f " . Let me 
explain this relationship using the previous example of ascending auction. For the market clearing 
yield to be determined at level  j p , the ascending auction process should not have stopped at each of 
the previous yield levels  1 p  through  1 − j p , and then it should stop immediately at the current yield 
level  j p . Thus, the probability that the market clearing yield will be  j p   is the product of the initial 
marginal probability and the subsequent conditional probabilities, leading to 
j j j h h h f ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − = − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 " . 
Again, imagine that you are attending an ascending yield auction and that you are now at 
“node”  j p . Based on your belief, if you are sure that the yield will be determined at the current level 
and thus you are in the terminal node  ) ( k j = , then you face no incentive to shade. On the other hand,   - 13 -
if you believe that the current node may not be the terminal node with positive probability  ) ( k j < , 
you face an incentive to save money by under-bidding, that is, by bid-shading. 
To shade or not, and how much to shade if you do, really depends on the relative strength of 
these two opposing forces. At  j p , you believe that this yield is the market clearing level with strength 
proportional to  j f , and you believe that this yield will further go up with strength proportional to 
k j f f + + + " 1 . The relative strength of these two forces is nothing but  j k j j f f f h / ) ( 1 / 1 1 + + = − + " . 
As you see from the equilibrium bidding function  ) ( ) (
* *
j j i j i p d p b δ + = , the amount of shading 
) ( ) (
* * *
j j i j i p d p d δ + −  is increasing in 
*
j δ , which is equal to  ) 1 / 1 )( (
*
1
* − − + j j j h p p , and thus 
increasing in  1 / 1 − j h  and  decreasing  in  j h . 
At each yield level, say  j p , the degree of shading really depends on  j h , which is the hazard 
rate at that yield level. This hazard measures the strength with which you believe that the market 
clearing yield will be determined at the current level without going up any further (conditional on that 
the auction process has already reached that level). Shading would be depressed as you believe more 
strongly that the current level is the final node, and it would be encouraged as you believe more 
strongly that the market clearing yield would further go up.   
 
3.3 Uniform price auction 
 
Unlike in the discriminatory auction, you do not pay what you bid. Rather, you pay what 
other participants bid “at the margin.” This aspect of the uniform price auction is quite similar to the 
second price sealed bid auction, resulting in “truth revealing” in both cases. The Korean treasury 
auction market is highly competitive as there are many market participants and as none of them has   - 14 -
dominant market power. A bidder believes that she can influence neither other bidders’ bidding 
behaviors nor the market clearing price, a reasonable description of the Korean treasury auction 
market. 
At all yield levels, bidders now do not face any incentive to shade. Bidder  i  bids if she 
wants an additional share in the sense that 
* 1 ) ( j i p q d ≥
− , and not otherwise, leading her to bid 
truthfully  ) (
*
j i p d  at  j p . Recall that in the case of the discriminatory auction, bidders only reveal 
the truth when they are 100% sure that there is absolutely no chance that the market clearing yield will 
further increase (that is, only at level  k p ). Now, in the case of the uniform price auction, bidders 
reveal truth at all price levels  k p p , , 1 " . 
Of course, we can verify the above heuristics by formally solving the bidders’ optimization 
problem. Let 
s p be the market clearing yield under the uniform price auction. Bidder  i  determines 


























4 11 0 j dp
− − ,” say 
*
j p , is again the unit bond price corresponding to the yield level of  j p .  
By solving the first-order conditions, we have   
[ ] 0 ) ( ) Pr(
* 1 = − =
−
j ij i j
s p s d p p   ⇔  ) (
*
j i ij p d s =  for  all  k j , , 1" = . 
Note that the solution takes the form  ) ( ) (
*
j i j i p d p s = ,  k j , , 1" = , that beliefs about the market 
clearing yield do not play any role, that bidders always reveal truth, and that there arises no shading at 
any yield level. 
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3.4 Recovering uniform price bidding from discriminatory price bidding 
 
Through the above two sub-sections, we have characterized the equilibrium bidding 
strategies under each of the discriminatory auction and the uniform price auction. Bidders shade their 
bids under the discriminatory auction, whereas they do not under the uniform price auction. The 
degree of shading is determined by the bidders’ belief about the market clearing yield under the 
discriminatory auction.   
     Once we identify the bidders’ common belief about the market clearing yield under the 
discriminatory auction, then we can recover their counter-factual bidding functions under the uniform 
price auction. 
     In the foregoing sub-sections, by implicitly assuming that bidder composition does not 
change as the auction mechanism changes, we have not addressed an important issue whether the set 
of auction participants grows or shrinks. It is arguably agreed that auction participants increase under 
the uniform price auction. It is because the uniform price auction is more friendly to individual 
participants in that individuls when making bids do not have to worry about the uncertainty in the cut-
off yield level. Individuals are more likely to join the treasury auction (of course, through their 
primary dealers) under the uniform price auction mechanism. If that is the case, our analysis, by 
assuming that auction participants do not change, would underestimate the market demand under the 
uniform price auction, and thus underestimate the auction revenue increase resulting from switching to 
the uniform price auction. 
Using the results in sections 2.2 and 2.3, we derive the relationship. 
) ( ) (
* *
j j i j i p d p b δ + = ,  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
*
j j i j i j i j i p b p s p d p s δ + = ⇒ = , 
where  ) 1 / 1 )( ( ) / ( 10 1
* 4 − − = = + j j j j j h p p d δ δ . Figure 2 shows this relationship.   - 16 -
 
Figure 2: Bidding functions: discriminatory vs uniform 
 
 
From the relationship, we observe that the degree of shading can be represented in two 
alternative terms: either by 
*
j δ  using bond prices as the measurement unit or by  j δ  using bond 
yields as the measurement unit. Let me explain bid shading using the latter term. It is a product of the 
following two terms. The first term,  j j p p − +1 , measures how much you gain in terms of the bond 
yield when you wait for another “node,” and the second term,  1 / 1 − j h , measures the relative strength 
of your belief with which you believe you would reach the next node rather than “burst.” 
Once we secure information on  ) , , ( 1 1 − k h h "   representing the bidders’ common belief about 
the market clearing yield under the discriminatory auction, we can recover the counter-factual bidding 
function  ) (p si   from the observed bidding function  ) (p bi . 








si(p)  bi(p) 
δj=(pj+1-pj)⋅(1/hj-1)  - 17 -
price auction, and  } , { ij ij p ∆   be those pairs,  i m j , , 1" = ,  n i , , 1" = . Of course,  } , , { 1 k ij p p p " ∈  
by construction. We have 
∑
+ ≤
∆ = + =
j j ij p p j




' ) ( ) (  
It is the “derived” bidding function of bidder  i  under the counter-factual uniform price auction. By 






j i j p s p S
1
) ( ) ( .  
The market clearing price will be determined as the minimum  j p  among the elements of 





j i j j p s p S p
1
} 1 ) ( ) ( : { . Once we compute the market clearing price, we can compute 
the auction revenue in the hypothetical uniform price auction. Thus, we can compute the percentage 
auction revenue increase which one enjoys by switching the auction mechanism from the 
discriminatory auction to the uniform price one. 
Depending on the amount of uncertainty regarding the market clearing yield spread, it may or 
may not pay to switch to the uniform price auction from the discriminatory one. It is an empirical issue 
after all. 
 
4. Data, Econometric Model 
 
The data are micro-level, individual bidding data for the recent discriminatory auction cases 
held in the Korean treasury auction market. Table 1 shows basic characteristics of each auction 
analyzed in this paper. Out of a total of 16 cases in the sample, 10 are taken consecutively from 
September 6, 1999 to January 10, 2000, and the remaining 6 from May 15, 2000 to July 18, 2000. 
During the in-between period, discriminatory auctions were used with variable supply. Variable supply   - 18 -
itself would make bidders shade. Not to confound the effect of discriminatory/uniform price auctions 
with the effect of fixed/variable supplies, we exclude these interim auction cases with variable supply. 
 












19990906  865  850 1.00 0.97  1195.16 
19990913  944  930 2.65 2.65  1196.19 
19990928  989  975 4.01 4.01  790.40 
19991004  839  836 1.00 0.97  1164.90 
19991011  841  837 2.68 2.68  1357.40 
19991018  938  939 4.05 4.05  798.30 
19991108  811  807 1.00 0.97  776.30 
19991115  838  832 2.68 2.68  1184.90 
19991206  870  869 2.67 2.67  349.80 
20000110  906  902 1.00 0.97  738.67 
20000515  929  929 3.79 4.05  279.60 
20000605  823  828 1.00 0.97  287.20 
20000612  865  863 2.51 2.67  578.70 
20000619  902  901 3.79 4.05  767.90 
20000710  795  790 2.45 2.67  586.00 
20000718  815  816 4.07 4.16  778.00 
 
From the discussions in section 2, we readily notice that the whole revenue comparison boils 
down to an issue of estimating uncertainty surrounding the market clearing yield spread. One may 
think of several approaches. First, use an empirical distribution of the historically observed yield 
spreads under the 16 discriminatory auction cases. Yield spreads are defined as the differences 
between the observed cut-off yields and the yields in the secondary market at morning of the auction 
date.  
The first approach is simple, but naive. Market clearing yield spreads may depend on a   - 19 -
number of variables. Here comes the second approach. Second, use a more sophisticated method. For 
this purpose, run a multiple regression of the yield spread, defined as the cut-off yield minus the 
secondary market yield, on a constant, maturity dummies, year dummies, number of bidders, and the 
auction size (face value). 
Once you estimate the regression coefficients (reported in Appendix Table A2), compute the 
16 residual terms (graphed in Appendix Figure A1). Then, we approximate the yield spread 
distribution as the empirical distribution function of these 16 residuals, shifted to the right by a 
relevant regression function. The regression function is obtained by combining the coefficient 
estimates with the current auction characteristics. We use this sophisticated approach in this paper. 
(The results were basically the same when we alternatively used the empirical distribution of the yield 
spreads historically observed, shifted to the right by the current secondary market yield.) 
Given the historically observed yield spreads, we would like to estimate  ) , , ( 1 1 − = k h h h " . 
For this purpose, let  ) 16 ( ) 1 ( p p ≤ ≤"  be those 16 realizations of the yield spread, that is, the 16 
residuals shifted to the right by the regression function. We measure them using 1 basis point as the 
measurement unit after approximating them upto the nearest integer values. Let  k  be the number of 
the distinctive elements among the  ) ( j p ‘s. Let us take these distinctive elements as  } , , { 1 k p p " , the 
support set of the market clearing yield spread. Let  1 1 , , − k f f "  be the empirical frequencies of 
) ( j p ‘s which are equal to  1 1 , , − k p p " . We estimate  ) , , ( 1 1 − = k h h h "  using  ) /( k j j j f f f h + + = " , 
1 , , 1 − = k j " . 
Often, it is tempting to impose monotonicity on  ) , , ( 1 1 − = k h h h "  that  1 1 − ≤ ≤ k h h "  holds. 
Imposing this monotonicity assumption is useful for the following two reasons. First, it will smooth 
out the empirical hazard estimates. Second, it is a priori reasonable to assume that the hazard rate of 
the “ascending yield” auction increases as the yield spread level further goes up.   - 20 -
     Estimating the empirical hazard rates under this assumption is easy using the so called 
“moving to the right” idea. Let us explain this idea. You first estimate  j h ’s as above, 
) /( k j j j f f f h + + = " . If the estimated hazard rates satisfy the monotone hazard property, stop. If 
not, search for the yield spread level sequentially from the lowest where the monotonicity breaks down 
for the first time. Let  j p  be such level, that is,  j j h h h > ≤ ≤ −1 1 " . You move one observation 
observed at  1 − j p  to the right such that it behaves as if it were observed at  j p . As a result of this 
“moving to the right,”  1 − j f  decreases by one whereas  j f  increases by one. Accordingly,  1 − j h  
decreases whereas  j h   increases. Repeat this moving to the right procedure until you have  j j h h < −1 . 
When the above step is over, you might have disturbed the previously holding inequality. If 
you happen to see  1 2 − − > j j h h , you move one observation observed at  2 − j p  two steps to the right 
such that it behaves as if it were observed at  j p . Moving one step to the right to  1 − j p , would cause 
j j h h > −1 , so this move is ruled out. As a result of this “moving to the right,”  2 − j f   decreases by one 
whereas  1 − j f  stays the same and  j f  increases by one. Repeat this “moving to the right” until you 
have  j j j h h h ≤ ≤ − − 1 2 . 
When the above second step is over, you might have disturbed the previously holding 
inequality. If you happen to see  2 3 − − > j j h h , you move one observation observed at  3 − j p  to  the  right 
such that it behaves as if it were observed either at  1 − j p  or  at  j p . Think again why moving to  2 − j p , 
one-step to the right, is ruled out. (It is because it would have caused  1 2 − − > j j h h .) Repeat this 
procedure until  j j j j h h h h ≤ ≤ ≤ − − − 1 2 3   holds. In this process, note the following two points. First, in   - 21 -
a given move, you do not want to move further to the right unless necessary. In the previous step, you 
would stop moving at  1 − j p   rather than further advancing to  j p   unless needed. Second, you stop the 
process of moving to the right immediately when you have  j h h ≤ ≤" 1 . 
Then, you search for a new yield spread at which the monotonicity breaks down (again for 
the first time), and repeat the whole procedures as explained above. Finally, you have  1 1 − ≤ ≤ k h h " . 
As we have mentioned above, these hazard estimates are advantageous in that they are smoother, and 
that they satisfy an a priori appealing monotonicity property.  
So far we have explained an approach to deriving the common belief about the cut-off yield 
level. Other approaches include (i) introducing GARCH type models into the error terms in the above 
regression approach, and (ii) estimating the yield spread distribution using information contained in 
the yields themselves and/or interest derivative products. Adding GARCH idea to the above procedure 
should be easy. Extracting additional information from the interest derivative products, should be a bit 
involved. 
For a given discriminatory auction case, once you estimate the percentage revenue difference, 
you want to compute its sampling error. There are two sources of the sampling error. One is the 
uncertainty arising from estimation of the yield spread distribution. The other is the uncertainty arising 
from who participate in a given auction. 
First, recalling that we have estimated this distribution using the 16 cases, we would like to 
measure this uncertainty by applying Bootstrap re-sampling techniques to those 16 cases. More 
concretely, out of 16 integers, 1 through 16, you select a set of 16 numbers through random sampling 
with replacement. Then, by using the auction cases corresponding to these 16 selected numbers, you 
re-estimate the yield spread distribution. Using the re-estimated spread distribution, re-estimate the 
percentage revenue difference. Then, repeat the whole procedures. This way, you can generate as   - 22 -
many percentage revenue differences as you wish. 
Second, given an estimate of the yield spread distribution, it is the set of the participating 
individual bidders who determine the percentage revenue difference. We also would like to address 
this second source of uncertainty by using the Bootstrap re-sampling techniques. We will re-sample 
the same size of the bidders from the original set of the bidders through sampling with replacement. 
More concretely, out of integers, 1 through  n , you select a set of  n  numbers by sampling randomly 
with replacement. Then, by using the bidders corresponding to these selected numbers, you re-estimate 
the percentage revenue difference. Then, repeat the whole procedures. This way, you can generate as 
many percentage revenue differences as you wish. 
To sum, we can measure the sampling uncertainty using the Bootstrap re-sampling techniques. 
There are two sources of sampling uncertainty. One type of uncertainty lies in estimating the yield 
spread distribution. The other, in sampling (drawing) individual bidders. Of course, we want to 
consider both sources of uncertainty jointly as well as separately. 
To address both sources of uncertainty, you apply the re-sampling scheme at both stages. In a 
single run, you first re-sample the 16 auction cases. Estimate the yield-spread distribution. Re-sample 
the set of bidders. Then, finally by combining the estimated yield distribution with the set of re-
sampled bidders, you come up with an estimate of the percentage revenue difference. Repeat the 
whole procedure as many times as you wish. 
        To address only the uncertainty in the yield spread estimates, you only apply the re-sampling 
scheme at the first stage. In a single run, you first re-sample the 16 auction cases. Estimate the yield-
spread distribution. (Use the original set of bidders. Do not apply re-sampling at the second stage.) 
Then, by combining the estimated yield distribution with the set of the original bidders, you come up 
with an estimate of the percentage revenue difference. Repeat the whole procedure as many times as 
you wish.   - 23 -
     Finally, to address only the uncertainty in the set of the participants in the auction, you only 
apply the re-sampling scheme at the second stage. (Use the 16 historically observed yield spreads to 
estimate the yield spread distribution. That is, do not apply re-sampling at the first stage.) In a single 
run, you use the yield-spread distribution estimated from the original 16 auction cases. You stick to 
this estimate throughout the replications. Only re-sample the set of bidders. Then, by combining the 
original yield distribution with the set of re-sampled bidders, you come up with an estimate of the 




     The Korean treasury auction market is highly competitive as there are 30 potential 
participants none of whom possesses dominant market power. Short squeeze does not arise as there is 
no “when-issued market” in the Korean treasury auction market. Lack of when-issued markets, though, 
increases uncertainty facing the cut-off price. 
     Tables 2 to 4 show the estimation results obtained under monotonicity assumption imposed 
on the hazard etimates. Results obtained without imposing the monotonicity assumption, are basically 
the same (available upon request). The auction carried out on Dec. 6, 1999 is much smaller in size. 
The results are basically the same whether we include or exclude this case. Also, regarding those 6 
discriminatory auction cases carried out between May 15, 2000 and July 18, 2000, our results are 
robust to inclusion/exclusion of these cases. 
Our empirical results show that uniform price auctions, had they been implemented, would 
have increased auction revenues during the sample period when the Korean government in fact used 
discriminatory auctions. Judging from Bootstrap re-sampling standard errors, we have established 
evidences that the uniform price auction, had it been adopted in Korea back in the years 1999 and   - 24 -
2000, would have increased auction revenue for 11 cases out of a total of 16 cases with an average of 
0.13 % revenue increase. 
     To sum, the uniform price auction is revenue enhancing in the Korean treasury auction 
market, and thus the Korean government’s switch to the uniform price auction in August 2000 was a 
right policy choice. 
 
Table 2: Percentage revenue difference between discriminatory and uniform auctions 
(both yield-spreads and bidders re-sampled; monotone hazard imposed) 
Auction 
Date 





19990906  0.05 0.05 0.02 0.10  -0.10 
19990913  0.15 0.15 0.06 0.31  -0.25 
19990928  0.36 0.38 0.09 0.54  -0.23 
19991004  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
19991011  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
19991018  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.00 
19991108  0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05  -0.01 
19991115  0.05 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.00 
19991206  0.05 0.02 0.08 0.33  -0.32 
20000110  0.06 0.06 0.01 0.07  -0.05 
20000515  0.31 0.32 0.04 0.41 0.11 
20000605  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
20000612  0.09 0.09 0.03 0.17  -0.06 
20000619  0.13 0.14 0.02 0.19 0.00 
20000710  0.18 0.18 0.03 0.24  -0.07 
20000718  0.07 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.00 
 
 
Table 3: Percentage revenue difference between discriminatory and uniform auctions 
(only yield-spreads are re-sampled; monotone hazard imposed) 
  auction 
date 




(%)   - 25 -
19990906  0.04 0.05 0.02 0.06  -0.10 
19990913  0.15 0.16 0.03 0.17  -0.20 
19990928  0.37 0.39 0.08 0.45  -0.22 
19991004  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19991011  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19991018  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19991108  0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 
19991115  0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.00 
19991206  0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 
20000110  0.06 0.06 0.01 0.06  -0.05 
20000515  0.30 0.32 0.04 0.41 0.12 
20000605  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
20000612  0.08 0.09 0.02 0.11  -0.01 
20000619  0.13 0.14 0.02 0.20 0.00 
20000710  0.18 0.19 0.02 0.22  -0.01 
20000718  0.07 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.00 
 
 
Table 4: Percentage revenue difference between discriminatory and uniform auctions 
(only bidders are re-sampled; monotone hazard imposed) 
auction 
date 





19990906  0.03 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.00 
19990913  0.17 0.16 0.04 0.32 0.08 
19990928  0.40 0.40 0.04 0.51 0.29 
19991004  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
19991011  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
19991018  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 
19991108  0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 
19991115  0.06 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.03 
19991206  0.06 0.02 0.08 0.40 0.00 
20000110  0.06 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.04 
20000515  0.33 0.32 0.01 0.37 0.32 
20000605  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00   - 26 -
20000612  0.10 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.02 
20000619  0.15 0.14 0.01 0.18 0.12 
20000710  0.19 0.19 0.01 0.24 0.16 
20000718  0.09 0.09 0.03 0.19 0.02 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we compare auction revenues across the two different auction mechanisms, 
discriminatory vs uniform price auctions, using a structural approach. The auction revenue difference 
critically depends on the hazard function estimates of the market clearing yield. We have estimated the 
hazard rates using the historically observed auction yield data, adjusted for several factors such as 
secondary market rates, maturities, years, number of participants, and the auction size. Using these 
historical data set, we estimate the hazard rates with and without imposing the monotone hazard 
assumptions. We believe that monotone hazard property makes senses, and that imposing it reduces 
the sampling uncertainty. 
     We measure sampling uncertainty using the Bootstrap re-sampling methods. We address the 
sampling uncertainty arising from the hazard estimates as well as the sampling uncertainty arising 
from who joins the auction. We address these two types of uncertainty separately as well as jointly. 
        This paper theoretically has clarified the role of the hazard rates in the discriminatory auction 
by comparing it to a typical principal agent model, and empirically has offered new ways of estimating 
the hazard rates. This paper has also suggested the use of Bootstrap re-sampling techniques to address 
sampling uncertainty from two different sources. Using the re-sampling method, we can identify these 
two types of uncertainty separately.   
This research leaves room for improvements, though. As the auction scheme changes,   - 27 -
participants may change. For example, as the auction mechanism switches from the discriminatory 
auction to the uniform price one, it is expected that more would participate in the auction. If so, our 
analyses based on “no change” assumption of the participants, would underestimate the revenue 
increase resulting from the switch. In this paper, as we have obtained such results that the uniform 
price auction increases the auction revenue under the “no participant change” assumption, our results 
would only have been strengthened if we had considered auction participation decision as well.   
This paper has not formally considered the auction participation decision. Theoretical as well 
as empirical analyses of the auction participation decision, would be interesting, and are left for future 
research. 
In this paper, we have assumed that all the auction participants have the same belief about the 
market clearing cut-off yields, and additionally that this belief is well approximated by the distribution 
of the historically observed cut-off yields once adjusted for factors like secondary market rates, 
maturities, years, number of participants, and the auction size. It would be interesting to see how the 
results change as one uses different distributions. 
     In this paper, we have explained how to recover bidding functions under the uniform price 
auction from those under the discriminatory price auction. One can apply the similar techniques to 
solve the reverse problem, that is, to derive bidding functions under the discriminatory auction from 
those under the uniform price auction. As the Korean government has switched to the uniform price 
auction from August 2000, we can also compare auction revenues across different auction mechanisms 
using the observed uniform price auction data. These results will be reported in a separate paper. 
     Using micro-level auction data, one can potentially think of three different approaches to 
measuring the percentage revenue difference between the uniform price and the discriminatory 
auctions. 
     First, “discriminatory to uniform.” This is an approach we have adopted in this paper. Given   - 28 -
individual bids under the discriminatory auction, we recover individual bids under the counter-factual 
uniform price auction. 
     Second, “uniform to discriminatory.” Given individual bids under the uniform price auction, 
we recover individual bids under the counter-factual discriminatory auction. 
        Third, we can compare historically observed auction revenues (or auction cut-off yields) from 
two different auction mechanisms. For this purpose, one may simply run a multiple regression of 
(auction revenue/face value) (or auction cut-off yield) on a constant, uniform price auction dummy, 
maturity dummies, year dummies, number of bidders, auction size, and the secondary market yield. 
Then, test the statistical significance of the coefficient of the uniform price auction dummy. If it turns 
out positive and statistically significant, then the uniform price auction is more revenue enhancing 
relative to the discriminatory auction and vice versa. (The opposite is true if one uses the cut-off yield 
as the dependent variable in the regression). 
        Among the three approaches, the first two are structural in nature in the sense that one has to 
use a theoretical model to derive the counter-factual individual bids from the observed ones. The third 
is purely statistical and reduced-form in nature in the sense that one does not need any theoretical 
model. 
        In terms of data requirement, the first two are less demanding as they only require data from 
one auction mechanism, discriminatory or uniform price. The third requires data from both auction 
mechanisms. In terms of “statistical control,” the first two approaches are advantageous. It is because, 
in the first two approaches, an auction case is compared to itself, eliminating the need for statistical 
control. However, the first two approaches critically depends on the theoretical model used and also on 
the empirical estimates of the cut-off yield distribution. 
     In the third approach, one discriminatory auction is compared with another uniform price 
auction. These two auctions are different not only in terms of the auction mechanism but also in many   - 29 -
other aspects such as maturities, years, number of bidders, auction sizes, secondary market rates at 
morning of the auction day, interest rate expectations, yield uncertainties, financial and macro shocks, 
and many other factors. Observable differences are controlled to a certain extent by including them as 
regressors in the multiple regression equation. However, it is simply impossible to control even the 
major differences in an adequate way, let alone all the differences. 
     We leave it as a future research to compare revenue differences across these three different 
approaches. Specifically we would like to address issues like (i) whether results from the structural 
approaches and results from the reduced-form approach would agree, and (ii) whether the two 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 shows the average and the standard deviation of the number of bids per bidder for 
each of the 16 discriminatory auction cases analyzed in this paper. 
 




19990906 3.16  1.37 
19990913 3.89  1.12 
19990928 3.30  1.44 
19991004 3.58  1.24 
19991011 3.83  1.36 
19991018 3.96  1.25 
19991108 3.60  1.39 
19991115 3.85  1.23 
19991206 1.73  0.79 
20000110 3.75  1.27 
20000515 2.00  1.13 
20000605 1.96  1.11 
20000612 2.95  1.32 
20000619 2.13  1.26 
20000710 2.60  1.29 
20000718 3.58  1.47 
16 auctions pooled  3.16  1.45 
 
Table A2 shows the results of regressing the cut-off yield spreads on several covariates using 
the 16 discriminatory auction data. Figure A1 is a histogram of the resulting residuals. 
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Table A2: Regression of the cut-off yield spread 
explanatory variable  coefficient estimate  t-value 
dmat=1 -1.32 -0.18 
dmat=3 -0.56 -0.08 
dmat=5 -1.67 -0.20 
D2000 -3.46 -0.73 
# of bidders  0.09  0.19 
Auction size  0.00  0.65 
Ú regression equation: (cut-off yield spread) = α1(maturity 1 year dummy)+α2(maturity 3 




Figure A1: Residuals from the cut-off yield spread regression 
 